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1 
INTRODUCTION
 
In the 1950s, the American steel industry dominated the 
world in steel production. It was a strong and thriving 
sector of our national economy. Throughout the 1970s, however, 
the steel industry has been in sharp decline. Foreign com­
petition, high labor costs, periodic recessions, and lack 
of modernization are some of the factors that have contributed 
to the industry's inability to produce steel in a competitive 
market. These developments in the steel industry have affected 
not only our national economy but also the lives of one million 
steelwo~kers. The ugly economic and social effects of. unemploy­
ment have caused hardship for many steelworkers,particularly 
in the Midwest and the Northeast. 
Because most of the closing steel plants are concentrated 
in this particular area, a serious regional problem has developed. 
Towns heavily dependent on the steel industry for jobs have 
suffered and continue to suffer from high rates of unemployment, 
a situation that is exacerbated by our current recession. If 
workers are not receiving income, they cannot continue to sup­
port the other businesses in the community. Local enterprises 
that rely directly or indirectly on the area steel plants are 
likely to suffer losses and may have to lay~off workers. Depart­
ment stores, restaurants, and entertainment houses may also 
close down from lack of customers. Because small towns depend 
on each other for goods and services, this economic decay has 
spread geographically, particularly with more and more steel 
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plants shutting down in the same area. Like the simple 
Keynesian multiplier, these negative effects have mUltiplied 
throughout the Midwest and the Northeast, causing severe economic 
problems for a key part of the country. 
The hardship caused by closing a steel plant, however, 
is not strictly economic. In a study done on the psychological 
and medical effects of unemployment, Sidney Cobb and Stanislav 
Kasl found that job loss can lead to short- and long-term health 
effects, such as ulcers, diabetes, and hypertension. 1 Further­
more, a study done by Harvey Brenner concluded that the 1.4 
percent rise in the unemployment during 1970 was directly re­
sponsible (nationally) for some 51,570 deaths, including 1,540 
additional suicides. 2 
As one would expect, many steelworkers have attempted to 
better their situation by migrating to the South and Southwest, 
where jobs are more plentiful. Yet more workers seem unwilling 
to make such a move because they do not want to leave the towns 
they grew up in or that they have family, and established friends 
in. Thus, as resources are transferred from aging steel mills 
to higher growth industries, the loyal steelworker is left be­
hind to bear the costs. Unemployment, psychological stress, 
and economic decay are the short-run effects of allocative ef-
I 
ficiency on thousands of steelworkers throughout the Midwest 
and the Northeast. A solution needs to be found that would ease 
these costs by maintaining job stability. 
The solution that I propose respects community ties, places 
a high priority on employment and allows workers to decide their 
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own economic future. If a steel mill closes down, the workers 
should be given the opportunity to purchase it and run it them­
selves. This would make workers directly responsible for the 
success of the plant and the maintenance of their jobs. No 
longer would they be at the mercy of some far away corporate 
headquarters. It is the position of this paper that given cer­
tain conditions worker ownership of steel plants can be effective 
in maintaining regional unemployment stability in the short-run. 
For the purposes of this paper, the terms: "worker owned and em­
10yee owned firms," and "cooperatives" all describe situations in 
which workers own the enterprise, and control the enterprise's de­
cisions. For further clarification, this paper is divided into 
six sections. Section one looks at the historical problems in 
the steel industry, tracing the origins of its 01igopo1istic 
market structure and its loss of market position. Section two 
analyzes the differences between an employee owned firm and a 
traditional firm. Section three deals with the problems faced 
in establishing a worker owned firm, particularly the problem 
of obtaining finacia1 capital. Section four discusses two 
different cooperative structures and analyzes their effective­
ness. Section five puts forth a model of worker ownership for 
a steel firm and evaluates this mode1's effect on productivity 
and investment. And finally, section six points out the short-run 
applicability of worker owned firms to steel shutdown situations. 
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Section I:	 A Historical Perspective on the Steel Industry
and its Problems 
The steel industry is an important part of our U.S. economy. 
Because of the number of workers the industry employs (close to 
one million), changes or problems within steel have serious im­
plications. In 1950, America's steel industry was the strongest 
and most powerful in the world, accounting for 50 percent of 
the world's steel output. Today, however, the United States 
accounts for less than 15 percent of the world's steel output 
and is the fourth largest steel producer--behind the Soviet 
Union, the European Community, and Japan. 3 As steel mills 
close down and workers lose their jobs, more and more people 
begin to wonder what has happened to this once booming industry. 
This section looks at the steel industry's development over 
time and evaluates the factors that have pushed it into decline. 
First, the vertical integration in the steel industry has re­
sulted in large firms and an oligopolistic market structure. 
Second, the industry's pricing policy is discussed. Then the 
effects of declining raw material prices, declining shipping 
costs, and the diffusion of new technology in the 1950's and 
60's are evaluated. The section concludes with a discussion of 
the steel industry's response to its declining market position 
and the implications of that response. 
In the early part of this century, many steel firms began 
to buy deposits of coal, iron ore and limestone. These ffrms 
also began to integrate the process of production by combining 
the preparation of materials, the smelting, the refining, the 
5 
rolling t and the finishing at one location. This type of in­
tegration was beneficial to the firm since the pig iron and 
steel could be kept at high temperatures as it moved from one 
stage to the next and the gasses and waste heat from the coke 
ovens and blast furnaces could be used elsewhere in the mill. 4 
This type of integration had the effect of increasing the size 
of the company and allowing the firm to realize desirable eco­
nomies of scale. However t vertically integrating suppliers of 
raw materials, that is purchasing raw material deposits t does 
increase the size of a steel firm but does not help that firm 
realize economies of scale. Rather, the reason large steel 
companies bought up iron ore and coal deposits was to insure 
themselves a steady supply of those natural resources. This 
action did not save the firm~( moneYt since they then had to 
invest in mines, transportation t and receiving centers. What 
did transpire t however, was that competition in the steel in­7 , .(.~!. 
dustry was gpae'.r than it would have been if the firms had 
not integrated. 5 
With the number of potential entrants reduced, mergers· 
among steel competitors formed large oligopolistic firms such 
as United States Steel. A group led by J.P. Morgan combined 
resources and bought up many big companies t the end product of 
previous mergers t creating United States Steel--the largest 
corporation evert at that time. In 1901, USS controlled 44 per­
cent of the country's reported steel-ingot capacitYt and 66 per­
cent of steel output. 6 These events t occurring in the early 
part of this centurYt serve as the foundation for the steel 
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industry's market structure. 
Not surprisingly, this oligopolistic structure facilitated 
collusion rather than aggessive competition. A pricing policy 
developed among the colluding firms, and because United States 
Steel was the prime mover behind this cooperative attitude, it 
assumed the role of price leader which it maintained for the 
first six decades of this century. Several pricing schemes 
were designed to assure that prices remained uniform throughout 
the industry. Perhaps the most famous were the basing-point 
pricing method and the multiple basing-point method. Up until 
1924, the basing-point price method was used by the steel in­
dustry. This system allowed each seller to know exactly the 
price it was expected to charge for each product at any loca­
tion in the country. Since Pittsburgh was the only basing point, 
the delivered price of any product was calculated as if the steel 
had been shipped from Pittsburgh, regardless of where it had, 
actually 'been shipped.] While this pricing scheme was effec­
tive in achieving complete price predictability in the industry, 
it artificially induced steel producers and consumers to locate 
in the Pittsburgh area and retarded the industrial development 
of the South and the West. 8 In 1924, the basing-point pricing 
method was replaced by the multiple basing-point pricing method. 
The principle of price uniformity and predictability remained 
the same under this new system. The only difference was that 
there were more basing-points in addition to Pittsburgh. Prices 
were quoted in terms of the nearest basing point (Chicago or 
Birmingham) plus the transportation cost to the point of delivery. 
•
 
After World War II, the FTC investigated the multiple basing­
point system and forced steel producers to switch to a f.o.b. 
(ex-mill) pricing system. Even under this system, however, 
companies are still able to quote their prices based on the lo­
9cation of other mills and able to absorb the freight costs. 
Not only were prices very uniform in the steel industry, but 
remarkably rigid and unresponsive to competitive market forces. 
This price rigidity continued up to World War 11. 10 "From 1947 
to the end of the 1950s, the pricing pattern in the steel market 
changed to one of greater flexibility but only in an upward 
direction." ll "Stair-step " price increases occurred at regular 
intervals, even when demand and unit labor costs were declining. 12 
Obviously, the steel industry felt the demand for steel was much 
more price inelastic than it actually was. Such an upward pricing 
policy also seems to ignore the existence of potential competi­
tors who were in Europe and Japan modernizing their mills and 
improving the efficiency of their production. 
Robert Crandall cites three occurrences as the main reasons 
for the U.S. decline in the world steel market: declining raw 
material prices, declining shipping costs, and the diffusion of 
new technology. Reacting to the fears of possible iron ore 
shortages, the industry raised ore prices in 1946. The result­
ing high prices encouraged other firms, both here and abroad, to 
seek out new iron ore deposits which were found in Canada, Vene­
zuela, and Australia. Thus by raising the price of iron ore, 
the steel industry eliminated its own advantage over other coun­
tries of owning low-cost convenient supplies of iron ore. 
•
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The cost of iron ore was made worse with the exhaustion of
 
the high-grade Mesabi Range ore. Since this range is depleted,
 
.the U.S. must depend on pellet plants that process lower-grade 
taconite ore from the Lake Superior region or on foreign ores. 
The costs incurred in processing lower-grade taconite ore are 
much greater than those incurred with high-grade ore from the 
Mesabi Range. "The result (therefore), is that inland Amertcan 
mills have gone from a position of having special access to low­
cost ore to one of depending on higher-cost ore than many of its 
foreign competitors have, especially Japan."13 With these new 
discoveries the world price of iron ore dropped and U.S. imports 
of iron ore increased. 
The second factor contributing to the steel industry's 
drop in the world market was the decline in world shipping costs. 
The cost of shipping iron ore from Brazil to Japan fell by 60 
percent from 1957 to 1968. 14 Furthermore, while shipping costs 
were declining, U.S. surface transportation costs were rising. 
This had significant cost consequences for the majority of U.S. 
steel plants, given their inland locations throughout the Midwest 
and Northeast. 15 Also, reduced shipping costs, when combined 
with declining raw material prices, promoted exports to distant 
markets that may have been previously unreachable--a fact that 
had an entirely different effect for Japan than for the U.S. 
In 1956, iron ore prices were $9.63 per ton for the U.S. and 
$16.69 per ton for Japan; however, in 1967 iron ore prices rose 
to $11.91 for the U.S. while .declining to $11.49 for Japan. 16 
These cost reductions were an ob~ious boost to an emerging steel 
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exporter like Japan. 
Not only were declining raw material prices helpful to Japan, 
but also the application of new technology helped their exports 
compete with more established U.S. firms. Because its industrial 
base was destroyed during World War II, Japan was able to totally 
rebuild its steel industry utilizing the most advanced technol­
ogy. This situational factor, combined with Japan's foresight, 
helped it surpass the ~ging American steel plants in output and 
efficiency. Crandall points out specifically the foresight of 
the Japanese: 
As the Japanese adopted the newest steelmaking tech­
nology (the basic oxygen furnace), pioneered in large
blast furnaces, and forged ahead rapidly with contin­
uous casting, their labor productivity increased dram­
atically. Moreover, the Japanese led the way in ap­
plying sophisticated computer control 19 the pouring,
forming and rolling of steel products. 
This new technology is directly responsible for the 30 percent 
decline, from 1958 to 1968, in Japanese unit labor costs which 
occurred as Japanese wages increased by 244 percent (in U.S. 
dollars). During this same period, U.S. wages rose by only 39 
18percent, and unit labor costs remained constant. To summarize, 
for most of the 1960s Japanese material costs, unit labor costs, 
and shipping costs declined while U.S. surface transportation 
costs increased, and material and unit labor costs remained 
practically constant. 
This world situation placed serious import pressure on the 
American steel industry and forced it to make a key policy de­
cision. The industry could fight the import competition by 
becoming technically more efficient, modernizing its plants, 
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and reducing its costs; or it could run to the government for 
protection. Choosing the protectionist course, the steel in­
dustry pressured the Johnson administration in 1968 to reach an 
agreement limiting imports from Europe and Japan. The "Voluntary 
Restraint Agreement" (VRA) was subsequently agreed upon and suc­
cessfully reduced imports by 22 percent in 1969 and by an ad­
ditional 5 percent in 1970. 
Those quotas were in effect from 1969 to 1974 and were in­
tended to provide temporary relief to the steel industry while 
it invested in new equipment to make itself more competitive. 19 
This reinvestment, however, did not occur; in fact, the steel 
industry had less capital expenditures in 1974 than in 1968. 20 
What did occur was investment diversification among steel firms 
in the industry. Many firms acquired other firms outside the 
steel industry and thus became conglomerates. In 1968, National 
Steel became joint owner of the fifth largest primary aluminum 
producer. In 1969 Armco Steel acquired HITCO,'one of the largest 
producers of nonmetallic composites.- In 1970, Inland Steel 
acquired Scholz Hanes. 21 The philosophy behind conglomeration 
is to spread out the investments of the firm, that is purchase 
companies in other sectors of the economy, so when one area of 
the economy declines the firm can still be supported by one of 
its companies in another sector. The investment decision of a 
conglomerate is to strengthen those companies or'plants that 
earn the highest rate of return; therefore if a steel plant has 
a lower rate of return than a non-steel company that the con­
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glomerate owns, the steel plant will not receive reinvestment 
funds. This type of disinvestment is exactly what happened and 
continues to happen in the steel industry. "Ironically, these 
moves of major steel companies into non~steel activities coin~ 
cided with loud protestations by these producers about inade­
quate resources to undertake the modernization of the antiquated 
plants in order to become cost-competitive by international 
standards. 2~ 
The steel industry not only failed to significantly re­
invest in its mills during this time, but it also allowed 
wages to rise dramatically. In 1967, average compensation in 
steel was about 38 percent above the average manufacturing in­
dustry. In 1974, steel wages were 60 percent above the manu­
facturing average wage, and in 1976 this differential rose to 
71 percent. These high wages can also be attributed to the 
powerful United Steel Workers Union, whose demands have not 
been known for fighting inflation. In 1973, the negotiated con­
tract provided a wage increase of 3 percent per year for 3 years 
plus an escalator clause that reimbursed workers for two-thirds 
to three-quarters of the recorded rate of inflation. With no 
productivity growth occurring after 1973, this was a very ex­
. 23penslve agreement .. 
These high labor costs, combined with renewed import pres­
sures, caused severe hardship for the steel industry in the late 
1970s. Several plants were closed in 1977, and workers were left 
unemployed. Seeking protection, industry and union officials once 
again pressured the administration to take action. The 
Carter administration,responded·by implementing the so-called 
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"Trigger Price Mechanism" (TPM). Trigger Prices were based on 
constructed Japanese production and transportation costs for 
steel shipped to the United States. Imports that came in from 
any country, not just Japan, at prices less than these trigger 
prices would result in increased duties. Essentially these trig­
ger prices set a floor on the prices of imported steel. 24 Fur­
thermore, the TPM allowed domestic producers to raise their 
prices to at least the list price thus eliminating all com­
petitive discounts which might have taken place in the ab­
sence of trigger pricing. 
In conclusion, the difficulties in today's steel industry 
are a product of a long history ~f non-competition. Its oligo­
polistic market structure fostered collusion and cooperation 
among firms, causing the industry to be unresponsive to changing 
market conditions. The American steel industry failed to modern­
ize its equipment in the 1950s and continued to raise its prices. 
As its market position deteriorated and import pressure from the 
Japanese apd Europeans increased, many steel firms invested in 
non~steel and the industry sought protection from the government. 
Despite the temporary help it received from the government, many 
steel plants, particularly in the Midwest and the Northeast, have 
closed down and thousands of workers have lost their jobs. This 
widespread unemployment is perhaps the most disturbing aspect 
of the steel industry's decline. Yet what should be done, if 
anything, to alter the course of the steel industry and aid its 
unemployed? Confronted with high input prices, especially in the 
areas of iron ore and labor, the American steel tndustry is at ~ 
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cost disadvantage with its world competitors. Unfortunately, 
most American steel mills have no choice but to face a high 
price for iron ore, because of the depletion of convenient de­
posits in the U.S. and because of their inland location. High 
labor costs, however, are something that can be changed. If 
this input cost disadvantage cannot be overcome, retraining 
should be implemented for workers as the industry is phased out. 
However, if a way can be found to lower labor costs and improve 
productivity enough to offset the cost disavantage of iron ore, 
the steel industry's oligopolistic market structure should be 
broken and greater competition among firms encouraged. The 
next section evaluates the applicability of employee ownership 
to the problems .of high labor costs, low productivity, and em­
ployment stability. 
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Section II: Employee Owned Firms and Traditional Firms 
When comparing employee owned single plant firms and tradi­
tional capitalist firms, it is important to point out their dif­
ferent internal structures. Traditional firms are characterized 
by three distinct bodies operating within the firm--the stock­
holders, a group of managers, scientists and highly skilled in­
dividuals that John Kenneth Galbraith refers to as the techno­
structure, and the production workers. Under this system the 
stockholders own the firm but do not control its production or 
investment decisions. In addition, the workers are employed by 
the firm, but they do not control the decisions. Rather, it 
is the technostructure that runs the firm and makes its de­
cisions. According to Galbraith, as long as an acceptable 
profit is being maintained, the stockholders will, in most 
cases, support the desires of the technostructure. Employee 
owned single plant firms, however, integrate these three bodies. 
Since the technostructure and the production workers own this 
type of firm, they are the stockholders. Furthermore, the techno­
structure is no longer the sole decision-maker, rather the pro­
duction workers together with the technostructure make the in­
vestment, production, and hiring decisions. This shift in owner­
ship and structure will cause employee owned single plant firms to 
behave differently and have different priorities than traditional 
firms. 
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The problems that beset the steel industry have all occurred 
within a traditional capitalistic economic environment. High pro­
duction costs and low rates of return have forced profit maxim­
izing conglomerate firms to close down steel plants throughout 
the Midwest and the Northeast. The hardship of unemployment suf­
fered by this regional segment of the population from such action 
shows a distrubing side to profit maximizing capitalism. In an 
effort to most efficiently use capital, the profit maximizing 
firm fails to account for the "social" costs and the spillover 
effects of closing a plant. The resulting unemployment affects 
individuals and communities in many ugly ways. Psychologically 
one1s self worth is decreased. The loss of revenue from a closed 
plant can severely affect a community's ability to provide ser­
vices. Furthermore, individual income loss has a negative ef­
fect on other businesses in the community. 
Unlike a capitalist firm, a cooperative form of organiza~ 
tion tends to give a greater weight to stable employment. Be­
cause ownership is spread among local workers these social costs 
are taken into account when decisions are made. This section will 
point out the different objective functions for the capitalist 
and the cooperative firm, and discuss the implications of these 
differences. Also. it will show how a cooperative can improve 
the rate of productivity by increasing worker incentives. Final­
ly, it will discuss the consequences of the trade-off between 
regional employment stability and efficient resource allocation. 
Since capitalist firms and cooperatives are organized dif­
ferently, they have different objective functions. In symbolic 
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notation, Branko Horvat expresses the following target function 
for cooperatives: 
( 1 ) 'ft = Pq - ~ d + f:Jj d }x + k) 
This is opposed to the following target function for a capitalist 
firm: 
(2) 'ff = pq - ~VMP}X + k] 
These two functions are given under the assumption that we are 
dealing with only two resources--capital and labor. In both 
equations (~) represents net revenue, (pq) equals gross rev­
enue, (x) the number of workers, and (k) depreciation. In the 
first equation, Horvat maintains that cooperatives set some as­
pired personal income for the firm or the worker-owners at the 
beginning of each year. Therefore, (d) represents some standard 
aspired income based on the previous year, and (Ad) equals the 
addition to this aspired income to be achieved in the current year. 
In the second equation, the (d + ~d) term is replaced by the 
value marginal product of labor (VMP) which is essentially the 
wage rate. 
In both equations 1 and 2, labor's and capital's contri­
bution is accounted for out of the gross revenue. Depreciation 
or (k) represents the marginal factor cost of capitalvand is 
I~vr~ 
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essentially the payment to capital for its contribution. (d +~d) 
and (VMP) are the payment to labor or its wage. Thus, before the 
profits are distributed, the contributions of both labor and cap­
ital are payed out. 
This distinction, (d + Od) and (VMP), between the two tar­
get functions has an effect on the number of workers employed 
by each enterprise. In the cooperative, (d + Ad) can be seen 
as the wage rate just as (VMP) is the wage rate in a conventional 
firm. The total compensation per worker, however, to cooperative 
worker-owners is: 
'1t + (d	 + bd)x 
x 
Unlike a capitalist firm, the net revenue in a cooperative ac­
crues not to the own~rs of capital but to the workers themselves. 
One can see how this affects employment in figure II-I, which is 
taken from A. A. Brewer's and M. J. Browning's analysis on em­
ployment decisions. 25 On the graph line (1) which is the total 
labor cost has a slope that represents the- marginal factor 
cost of 1abor,- assuming that wages are detell'mined in a 
competitive market. For a cooperative, this represents the wage 
one could earn outside the cooperative. By drawing lines (a) 
and (b), having the same slope as line (1), tangent to curves 
(d + Ad)x and ~ + (d + Ad)x respectively, we can see a relation­
ship between the number employed and the level of compensation. 
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At line (a)' s point of tangency with curve (d +Ad)x. the mar­
ginal revenue of labor equals the marginal factor cost of labor. 
and the result is an employment level of N1. The same is true 
at line (b)' s point of tangency with a curve ~ + (d +~d)x which 
results in an employment level of N2. Therefore. because their 
workers receive a portion of net revenues. a cooperative is able 
to employ greater numbers of workers. 
Figure II-I 
$ 
'it"" + (d +~.. d)x* 
(d + 6d)x*wage bill={VMP) 
"----..L--"---------------N 
Furthermore. there exists a distinction in maintaining em­
ployment between the cooperative and the conventional firm. When 
wages are negotiated with a union. they are often done so for a 
period of years at a time. This wage rigidity. combined with 
management's reluctance to alter its own salaries. forces tra­
ditional firms to use layoffs as a way of cutting costs during h~rd 
economic times. These wage contstraints~Jhowever. are not pla~ed 
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upon a cooperative. Wages can change as soon as workers allow 
them to change. Since stable employment is a high priority of 
cooperatives, there is a great reluctance to layoff fellow 
worker-owners. If faced with declining demand, the cooperative, 
instead of reducing the number of workers, will reduce its as­
. . 26plred level of lncome, (d). 
In addition to maintaining employment, evidence suggests 
that cooperatives can increase technical efficiency through"" 
higher rates of productivity. Often antagonism between labor 
and management occurs in a capitalist firm. The relationship 
between workers and managers tends to be authoritative, with 
workers having little, if any, input into how the firm is run. 
The democratic structure of a cooperative however breaks down 
this labor-management antagonism. Workers make the operating 
decisions and those selected to manage or serve as administrators 
are simply viewed as fellow partners who perform different func­
tions. As a worker at the Meriden cooperative plant in Britain 
put it, liThe comflradeship was fantastic. We all felt we were 
fighting for an ideal of showing that we could make bikes and 
make a profit. Nowadays, if we have a"problem, it is a com­
mon enemy for us all to solve." 27 Increased harmony among the 
workers undoubtedly has spillover effects on productivity. When 
I 
workers are pleased with their jobs, they are likely to work more 
efficiently. 
Reducing the wage differential is another way cooperatives 
break the tension between labor and management. This shift in 
wages creates a more democratic environment which is conducive to 
•
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higher rates of productivity. Examples of greater wage equ1iza­
tion exist both here and abroad; the Meriden cooperative in Brit­
ain, the Mondragon cooperative in Spain, the plywood coopera­
tives of our Northeast, and the Vermont Asbestos Group have all 
had low salary ratios between the highest and lowest-paid work­
ers or managers when compared with capitalist-owned firms. 28 
Furthermore, because greater wage equality reduces the compe­
tition for promotion, workers are more likely to teach other skills. 
However, if wages are made equal for all workers, negative ef­
fects are likely to result. The U.S. plywood cooperatives are the 
prime example of equal wages for all workers regardless of the 
task they perform. This action has caused jealousy and i11­
feelings among some workers, especially the highly skilled, who 
resent the fact that workers with much less experience and exper­
tise earn as much as they do. 29 In addition to nurturing jea1­
ousy, total wage equalization removes from the enterprise any 
monetary incentive system for allocating human resources. 
Maintaining a wage differential encourages people to utilize 
their best abilities, which, in turn, benefits the enterprise 
and society as a whole. Therefore, it would appear that a co­
operative could be most effective when the wage differential is 
narrowed but not totally equalled. 
~ 
Aside from reducing the antagonism between labor and manage­
ment, and the wage differential, the cooperative's key to higher 
rates of productivity is simply allowing workers to have direct 
control over the decisions of the firm. Even "in capitalist firms, 
improved job satisfaction through small increases in worker­
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participation has increased productivity. The worker-partici­
pation programs in Japan and Germany have undoubtedly contributed 
to their high rates of productivity. One can understand how work­
ers might work harder when they know they have input into the de­
cision-making process of the firm and are receiving a portion of 
its net revenues. Worker ownership and control actually give 
the workers responsibility for the firm's success or failure and 
this responsibility provides a strong incentive for workers to 
produce a quality product and produce it efficiently. In a 
study done comparing the efficiency of garment workers who were 
allowed to discuss and decide upon production with those allowed 
to discuss only, L. C. Lawrence and P. C. Smith found that 
lithe discussion-and-decision group increased its productivity 
to statistically significant levels over is own pre-experiment­
al level and over that of the discussion-only group.1I 30 
An additional difference between a traditional firm and a 
cooperative is that the cooperative trades off some allocative 
efficiency for greater employment stability. Although the invest­
ment decisions of traditional conglomerates are consistent with 
profit maximizing behavior, they literally hasten the death of 
steel plants with a low rate of return. Taking a portion of the 
profits from one plant with a low rate of return ,and reinvesting 
those funds' into a plant with a high rate .of:return places a tre­
mendous cost, both economic and social, on the workers of that low 
return plant and the community surrounding·it. Often it is 
assumed that movement among jobs and geographic locations will 
• •
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compensate for labor market changes. This assumption, however, 
tends to be false in the short-run. While the younger, skilled, 
and geographically less committed workers may be able to move; 
the older, less skilled workers are less likely to re1ocate.es~ 
pecia11y when they have stakes in the community such as money 
tied up in their homes, relatives, or long-term social re1ation­
ships.31 Under a cooperative, capital would be tied much more 
to groups of people in certain geographic locations. It is a 
form of ownership and a structure that meets the needs of a re­
gional population rather than a structure that forces that pop­
ulation to adjust to it. 
Essent~ly, cooperatives involve a re-ordering of prior­
ities. In a traditional firm profit-maximization is the key 
objective, but in a cooperative, this is not the case. Main­
taining employment stability while providing a decent standard 
of living to its workers is the goal of a cooperative. This 
goal, however, does result in a cost--the loss of some a110cative 
efficiency in the short-term. More stable regional employment is 
achieved at the expense of greater capital availability in higher 
growth areas. Yet something should be done to ease the burden 
placed on low rate of return communities. Worker ownership 
has its strength in maintaining employment and keeping workers 
productive. As former vice-president Walter Monda1e states, 
It's time to focus on an element missing in the American 
economy-~he right of workers, their families and the com­
munities in which they live to some sort of decent treat­
ment and concern when a company is planning or considering 
the possibility of c10sing.32 
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Section III:	 Problems Faced in Establishing an Employee
Owned Firm 
Employee ownership is a viable option to a community con­
cerned about the unemployment created by a closing plant. In 
fact, employee ownership is often the last hope for communities 
to maintain economic activity. Although workers may have the 
incentive to purchase the closing plant, actually achieving 
this goal is a task that requires a great deal of coordination 
and is not without difficulties. This section discusses some 
of the problems that are often found in the process of estab­
lishing an employee owned enterprise. The first problem is 
the inadequate advance warning corporations give to their workers 
when they have decided to shut down a plant. Second, corporations 
are often reluctant to sell the plant to the employees for 
various reasons. The third and most important problem is ob­
taining enough financial capital to purchase the plant. This. 
problem will require leaders and feasibility studies. Further­
more, it may mean issuing common stock and soliciting govern­
ment loans. The final problem discussed is the proper role for 
the union in an employee owned firm. 
~hen a company decides to close a plant, it tends to give 
very little warning to the workers. The Lykes corporation gave 
no advance warning when it shut down the Campbell Works portion. 
33
of tts·YoUngstown' Sheet and ITube facilities. The Sperry 
Rand corporation, however, announced its intention to close the 
Library Bureau, a maker of library furniture, with the nebulous 
34phrase, "within twelve months." The implications of such short 
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notice, usually a matter of months, is that workers are put under 
pressure and must work very fast to find leaders, organize them­
selves, and obtain financial capital. It should be noted that 
the workers at the Weirton steel plant, who in March of this year 
reached an agreement to purchase the plant, were not subjected 
to this late warning problem. National Steel, the conglomerate 
owner, announced a full year in advance its intention to stop 
investing in the Weirton plant. 35 This twelve month period gave 
workers and community leaders time to devise a purchase plan 
that seems to have worked. Thus, the severity of this "warning" 
problem seems to depend on the attitude of the owning corporation 
toward the possibility of worker ownership. 
Another problem frequently encountered is the current owner~s 
unwillingness to sell the plant. Management may feel that they 
can make more money selling the equipment and writing off the 
buildings. In these cases, workers have often secured local 
congresspersons to apply pressure on company officials, in or­
der to get them to negotiate. In other cases, management may be 
reluctant to sell because of the possibility of competition from 
36its former plant. Occasionally a company will initially re­
fuse to negotiate a sale only to change its mind when it sees 
that the workers are serious about buying the plant and are 
raising the necessary funds. This was the case with the Library 
Bureau. Sperry Rand refused to negotiate, but then later, reacting 
to public pressure and community mobilization, changed its mind and 
negotiated. 
The third problem is perhaps the most difficult problem in 
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establishing an employee owned enterprise: financing the purchase 
of the plant. This problem can be made less severe, however, if 
three roles are filled. 
1) A chief executive officer (CEO) capable of providing
managerial leadership in production and marketing. 
2) A financial expert capable of analyzing financial 
needs and dealing with sources of funds. 
3)	 An organizer able to link together workers, manage­
ment people, community leaders, politicians, govern­
ment officials, and the press in an at least tempo­
rary coalition to launch the project. 37 
The prime task of these three individuals will be to raise enough 
capital to buy the plant. The prospective managerial leader 
must have the confidence of bankers and community members in 
order for the employee enterprise to secure loans and issue 
stock. Often this person emerges as one of the key managers in 
the closing plant. While this person would have intimate know­
ledge of the plant, s/he must also be willing to adjust to the 
new form of ownership and must be trusted by the workers them~ 
selves. If an executive does not step forth from the closing' 
plant, a more complicated problem can develop. "(Any) prospective 
CEO is unlikely to consider the position seriously unless he sees 
that the problems of financing the purchase and providing oper­
ating capital have been solved. At the same time, those in­
dividuals and organizations counted on for equity or loan capital 
are not inclined to commit their money until they are persuaded 
that a competent CEO has accepted the challenge offered him." 38 
Unfortunately, such a dilemma can only be worked out through the 
circumstances of each individual case. 
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The organizer role should be filled by someone who knows 
the community and can take charge of a money-raising campaign. 
This person must find creative ways to get community financial 
support, i.e. telethons, door-to-door soliciting, or community 
club fund drives. More importantly, however, the organizer 
must bring together competing factions within the plant, and 
must work with the financial expert in obtaining the interest 
coopera 0 f pu agencles 39an d t lon· . bl . lC . an d banks. Th e f·lnanCla. 1 
expert, in turn, must know where money is available and how to 
get it. This person must also know how to work within the local, 
state, and federal governments. Together with the organizer, 
the financial expert needs to discover the best way to approach 
the issue of issuing bonds to the community and acquiring do­
nations. Generally, people will contribute to a plant's pur­
chase once they see how the economic viability of the community 
is related to the ecnnomic viability of the closing plant. The 
organizers of the Library Bureau purchase, for example, raised 
over 2.6 millionfr.om the surrounding community.40 
Aside from soliciting bonds and donations, obtaining loans 
from banks and government agencies will be anoth~r financing dif­
ficulty. First, a feasibility study needs to be commissioned in 
order to purchase the plant and gage its profit potential. In 
1977 at Youngstown, Ohio, a Philadelphia engineering firm and the 
Western Reserve Economic Development Agency (WREDA) conducted a 
study to determine the feasibility of acquiring and operating 
the closed portion of the Campbell Works steel facility.41 The 
study concluded that "the purchase and modernization of the 
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Campbell Works would require a capital investment of about $500 
mi11ion. 1I 42 Writing on Youngstown's steel mill closings, St~ughton 
Lynd goes on to state, IIWe could not reopen any of these monster 
mills {in the Mahoning Valley of Ohio} without amounts of capital 
11that only the government could provide ... 43 These large sums 
of money, however, are difficult to raise with no advance warning 
of the shutdowns, as was previously discussed. The leaders at 
Youngstown were only able to secure $100 million in federal loan 
guarantees from the EDA and $10 million in state assistance. 44 
It is not clear, however, whether government loans are 
necessary for all employee purchase initiatives. The employees 
who are purchasing the Weirton steel plant have not received 
any government grant or loans. "A price of $66 million was 
set for the mill and the equipment by bargainers on a Joint Study 
Committee~ including representatives of theemp1byee ' s union, 
the independent steelworkers, and the Weirton Division and th~ 
National Steel Corporation. 1I 45 This pri~~ represents 22 percent 
{sic} of the $322 million book value that National Steel has 
placed on the plant. Many steel assets, however, have been sel­
ling for far less than book value, given the depressed state of 
the industry. The new employee owned company is also scheduled 
to purchase, for $300 million, raw materials and other inventory 
from National Steel. 46 
Under the Weirton purchase plan, only a $100-$150 million in 
immediate financial backing is being required; furthermore, the 
$66 million would be paid out over 15 years. The first payment 
on the principal would be due in 1989. No interest would be 
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paid until the new company had a net worth of $100 million. 
The interest rate after that would be 10 percent." 47 As for 
the $300 million that would be paid for inventory, $75 million 
of that $300 million would be paid in cash immediately and the 
rest over as much as 28 years. The terms of this deal are ex­
cellent; National Steel also agreed to assume all pension costs 
and other shutdown costs if the new company failed in the first 
five yea~.48 The Weirton Works is relatively modern and has a 
good reputation for producing a quality product; therfore, its 
chances of obtaining sufficient financial capital may be better 
than for a more antiquated plant. Yet the experience at Weirton 
indicates that massive amounts of support from the government 
may not always be required when employees purchase a closing 
steel mill. 
A final problem in establishing an employee owned firm is 
deciding how the union will fit into the new enterprise. Union 
leaders traditionally have been hostile to the idea of employee 
ownership, no doubt out of fear for their own survival. Yet 
as union officials have seen employee ownership effectively 
save jobs and still retain local union representation, their 
hostility has subsided. Speaking about employee stock ownership 
plans (ESOP) in 1981, James Smith, Assistant to the President 
of the United Steelworkers of America, states their concerns: 
.... 1 certainly wouldn't fear for the future of U.S.W.A. 
if every employer in the United States became an ESOP 
company. However, there are some minimal conditions 
of ESOPs that unions will demand, 1 believe. TheY in­
clude the following: 
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1)	 That employee stock ownership only occur in
 
addition to an adequate (sic) funded pensTOn

plan. In other words, if employees buy stock
 
they should do so out of current earnings while
 
they are active workers, rather than as a sub­

stitute for insured retirement income.
 
2)	 That full pass-through of voting rights be
 
made to every employee on an equitable basis,
 
with no subterfuge or managerial manipulation

such as occured at South Bend Lathe (a com­

pany which will be discussed in the next
 
section) or most other small ESOPs.
 
3)	 That the stock issued to e~ployees also'be
 
marketed publicly, so that there can be some
 
outside judgement of its worth as an invest­

ment. In cases where this is impossible there
 
should be a periodic outside appraisal by a
 
firm jointly picked by representatives of work­

ers and manager. 49
 
These statements by Smith are interesting because they in­
dicate a willingness on the part of the U.S.W.A. to work with 
such employee ownership plans. Yet, unions are still very ap­
p~~b~nsive about~total worker o~nership and control. In point 
number three, Smith advocates marketing stock publicly. While 
this may indeed be a way of judging the worthiness of the in­
vestments, it also takes some control of the enterprise away from 
the	 workers. If a union is to successfully work within an em­
ployee owned firm, it must recognize that its role is different 
under employee ownership. The union must discard its past role 
of antagonist and instead encourage mutual cooperation, realizing 
that everyone, in~luding management, is a worker-owner. This 
shift in attitude, however, does not seem likely to occur in a 
union such as the U.S.W.A. While the U.S.W.A. may understand 
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employee stock ownership plans and may be less hostile to their 
application, it has given no indication that it is willing to 
adjust its role under employee ownership. The union's long 
history as the adversary of management is difficult to alter 
simply by converting a plant to employee ownership. Therfore, 
the inclusion of a union in a worker owned firm is still un­
clear. If a union is included it must fully understand its 
new role and practice it diligently. Yet the likelihoo~ of a 
large union such as the U.S.W.A. making such a change remains 
doubtful at this time. 
In conclusion, the greatest problem workers will face in 
saving a plant through a plan of worker ownership will be raising 
financial capital. This task is made more difficult by the 
lack of advance warning corporations give'when closing a plant or 
by the reluctance some corporations have to sell the plant to 
the employees once the decision to shut it down has been made. 
This financing problem, however, can be made easier if a com­
munity organizer, a financial expert, and a trusted managerial 
leader can be found and utilized. _These individuals will prob­
ably obtain funds by Issuing bonds, or through loans from banks 
and government agencies, depending on the terms of the purchase 
agreement. And finally, the problem of a union in an employee 
owned firm will most likely be decided by the union's willing­
ness to alter its role to fit the new enterprise. 
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Section IV: Different Cooperative Structures 
Up to this point, we have traced the problems of the steel 
industry, examining the origins of its oligopolistic market 
structure, its high labor costs, and its lack of investment. 
We have looked at the,differences between :worker owned enterpris­
es and conventional capitalist firms. Also, we have discussed 
some of the problems in establishing a worker owned enterprise, 
such as financing the purchase and the union's position in the 
new firm. This section examines the organizational structure 
of a cooperative firm and sets down some necessary guidelines 
for democratically managing a worker owned firm. Two different 
examples--the U.S. Plywood cooperatives, and the South Bend Lathe 
Comapny--are evaluated. After reviewing the advantages and dis­
advantages of each structure, a clearer picture emerges of just 
what is and what is not desirable in.a worker owned fffm:. 
In Workplace Democratization, Paul Bernstein indicates six' 
components necessary for the maintenance of democratization with­
in a firm: 
1) Participation in decision-making, whether direct or 
elected representation. 
2) Frequent feedback of economic results to all em­
ployees (in the form of money, not just information). 
3)	 Full sharing with employees of management-level in­
formation and, to an increasing extent, management­
level expertise. 
4) Guaranteed individual rights (corresponding to the 
basic political liberties). 
5) An independent board of appeal in case of disputes 
(composed of peers as far as possible}. 
I 
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6) A particular set of attitudes and values (type of 
consciousness). 50 
These six components are vital factors of any organizational form 
that could be referred to as "cooperative" in nature. As was 
mentioned earl ier, ·the terms "cooperative, "worker owned firm," 
or "employee owned firm" all describe an enterprise in which the 
workers own the stock and control the decision-making process. 
Stock ownership, however, can be distributed in different ways. 
It may be spread among the workers by giving each worker one 
share or an equal number of shares. It may be that the stock 
shares are allocated to workers based on their salary or their 
years of service. Under a different structure, a trust fund may 
be established through which workers are given stock shares; 
this is commonly known as an employee stock ownership trust (ESOT). 
Regardless of how the stock shares are distributed, the dis­
tance between labor and management is reduced in a cooperative~ 
Decisions are no longer made by the owners of capital but by 
the owner-workers. Thus, a cooperative takes Bernstein's first 
component to its extreme. Workers do not just participate in de­
cisions, rather they control the decision-making process. The 
third component is also very important in a cooperative. Since 
those selected to manage are directly responsible to the workers, 
financial and other information must be shared regularly- with 
them. A "cooperative" attitude, component six, is also vital to 
a worker owned firm since it often inspires workers to participate 
in decision making. Equ~lly important are components two, four 
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and fivejall of which make good common sense in any business or­
ganization. 
The first example to be evaluated is taken from the u.s. ply­
wood industry which has a rich tradition of cooperatives. Since 
the founding of the first one in 1921, the number of cooperatives 
in this industry has risen to twenty-six; today, however, only 
eighteen firms continue to operate. 51 The·decision-making struc­
ture varies from co-op to co-op but the basic principles are the 
same. Each worker owns one share and casts one vote in company­
wide elections. All the employee shareholders meet annually to 
elect from their membership a board of directors, usually seven 
to nine people. This board makes the policy decisions for the 
firm, but has its power checked by the whole body of workers in 
a number of ways. Expenditures over $25,000 as well as any 
major investment or expansion decision must be approved by the 
entire membership. Furthermore, in some companies, the workers 
can challenge a decision of the directors by obtaining the sig­
natures of 10 to 20 percent of the membership on a petition and 
calling for a special meeting. In addition to making policy 
decision~,-the board"of directors· appoints a general manager, 
usually someone from outside the firm, who is responsible for the 
day-to-day operations of the business. 52 This position of general 
manager is vital to the cooperative, and the person selected must 
have an astute business sense as well as the political skills to 
deal with a large number of worker-owners. Although the general 
manager directs the workers on a day-to-day basis, this person 
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must ultimately answer to the workers, since they set his salary 
and control his employemnt. 
The members of the board of directors are also directly ac­
countable to their fellow workers. Those elected to serve on 
the board of directors receive no special pay and continue to 
work in the plant while serving on the board. The fact that 
directors still work in the plant conveniently allows other 
workers to make complaints dir~ctly to them during working hours. 
Furthermore, if the workers do not like what a particular board. 
member is doing or how that person is acting, they can simply 
not reelect that person. 
This internal structure of the plywood cooperatives has some 
advantages. First of all, workers do in fact own the firm and 
control its decisions. A general manager is appointed, but be­
cause of the size of the firm, s/he cannot ignore or dismiss the 
desires of the workers. Second, because those members on the 
board of directors tend to come from different areas of opera­
tions within the plant and because the plant is very small, making 
it possible for them to work alongside other workers, they re­
ceive a fairly accurate picture of the company and the concerns 
of the workers. Furthermore, the informal discussions workers 
and directors have on the job truly influence the board's de­
cisions. 
The result of this type of ownership and internal organizational 
structure has meant high rates of productivity in these plywood 
firms. When workers realize that they are responsible for the 
35 
company's success and that they have a direct influence on pol­
icy decisions and that they are receiving a share of the firm's 
profit, they tend, not surprisingly, to be more productive. "A 
study in the 1960s, according to researcher Katrina Berman, showed 
the worker-owned firms produce 30 percent more per worker than 
traditional firms. Even the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, in 
a tax case against the plywood cooperatives, essentially con~ 
firmed cooperative data showing the co-ops are 25-60 percent 
more productive than conventional mills." 53 This high product­
ivity level allows these cooperatives to pay their members con­
siderably more than the average conventional unionized plants. 
Often this is 20 percent more per hour, which is added on to 
the workers' share of the income the cooperative expects to 
have earned by the end of the year. 54 
Aside from these advantages, the plywood cooperatives are 
still plagued with problems. Often many workers fail to see 
the necessity to invest for the long-term; they seem far more 
concerned with taking home as much money as possible. 55 This 
short-sighted attitude places difficult constraints on the gen­
eral manager who is often fighting for greater investment. An­
other problem irising is that the manager's responsibility to act 
on the desires of the membership tends to make him more conserva­
tive and less likely to take calculated risks. This managerial 
position in turn, could severely hinder the firm's technological 
innovation. 56 Still another problem occurs with expanding the 
membership. The workers- each own one share of stock which has 
increased in value over time as the cooperative has grown and 
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matured. As the enterprise expands, the membership could be ex­
panded by issuing new shares, but workers are reluctant to do 
this for fear that the value of their own shares would decline. 
The value of the shares, however, does not necessarily decrease 
because more are issued. Only if the number of new shared is­
sued is increasing more than the market value of the firm will 
the value of the shares decline. 
Restricting membership out of the fear of declining stock 
value is referred to by self-management researchers as "co l­
lective selfishness." 57 A result of this "se lfish" behavior is 
an old and closed membership and/or the introduction of non­
owner workers. Unfortunately, including these non-owner hourly 
workers in the cooperative brings in worker attitudes much too 
similar to those in a conventional firm. These workers earn 
about 50 cents per hour less than the co-op members, receive no 
share of the profits, cast no votes, and usually get assigned 
to the worst jobs. 58 The very presence of these workers acts 
counter to fostering a cooperative spirit among workers and is 
likely to present a serious drag on the cooperatives level of 
productivity. A final problem with the plywood cooperatives 
is that of continuity. As the cooperative members practice col­
lective selfishness and continue to raise their level of product-
I 
ivity, the value of their shares increase. Thus, the old members 
have a strong incentive to sell their shares at a handsome profit 
to conventially owned firms that are capable of paying the market 
value of their shares. The~result of this action .is that the work­
ers leave with a good sum of money but the cooperative dies out. 
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This is exactly what happened to half of the eight plywood co­
operatives that went out of business between 1921 and the 
present. 59 Because these cooperatives were so successful, their 
shares increased tremendously in value. The high price per 
share made it impossible for other workers to buy into the co­
operative; hence, large corporations seeing a potential profit­
making opportunity and possessing the financial resources to 
purchase the shares, bought out the cooperatives and returned them 
to conventional ownership. 
A second example of worker ownership is exhibited by the 
South Bend Lathe company. After Amsted Industries announced it 
was going to close the plant, the president of the plant, and 
plant managers, met with local union officials, city bankers, 
and government officials to piece together an Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan that would enable the workers and salaried man­
agers to buy the pl ant. 60 The pl an worked as follows: 
-The Economic Development Agency gave $5 million grant
 
to the city of South Bend which immediately lent the
 
money to a newly created employee trust fund.
 
-The employee trust also borrowed another $5 million
 
from three commercial financial institutions.
 
-Meanwhile, the managers and employees created a new
 
corporate entity, which issued 10,000 shares of stock; 
with the $10 million in cash~·fhe employee trust bought 
the stock; in turn, the new corporate entity paid the $10 61 
million to Amstead Industries and bought South Bend Lathe. 
Under this.new plan, the company will put a portion of the annual 
profits into the employee trust which will be used to payoff the 
company's long-term loans. Furthermore, the profits de­
posited in the"trust are tax-deductable-a major reason why ESOPs 
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are implemented. As the company's loans are paid off, employees 
receive a certain number of stock shares based on how long they 
have worked in the company and how much money they earn. 62 
After the workers took over ownership, the company's financial 
picture improved. The University of Michigan Institute for Social 
Research reported the pre-tax profits for t~e first year of work­
er ownership were 20 percent on invested capital. "The research­
ers also reported--based on data collected 18 months after the 
workers had bought the factory--that productivity appears also 
to have increased since the change in ownership, while quality 
has also improved."63 As time went by, however, workers real­
ized that ownership is not the same as control. They began to 
complain about not being consulted on major investment decisions, 
or about being treated poorly by managers. One worker sums it 
up by saying, "When you get down to the real meat of it, there 
really isn't much difference (than how it was in the past.)11 64 
There is also the problem of equality in compensation. Because 
profit bonuses are distributed according to salary, managers, 
with higher salaries, get much larger bonuses. South Bend Lathe 
is a prime example of ownership without control .. IIWhen the ESOP 
is designed exclusively by management (as in this case), it is 
possible to structure the trust agreement in such ways as to 
keep legal control in the hands of management indefinitely, in 
which case opportunities for workers' participation will depend 
upon what management concedes voluntarily or under union pres­
65 
sure·~11 
After examining the plywood cooperatives and South Bend Lathe's 
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structure, the attributes and deficiencies of both programs be­
come clear. In terms of Bernstein's democratic guidelines, the 
plywood cooperatives have done pretty well. Workers have con­
trol over the decisions of the firm. They are receiving monetary 
feedback in the form of equal wages and stock ownership. Also, 
management-level information is being regularly shared with the 
workers. The equal wage structure and the willingness of workers 
to serve on the board of directors without extra pay indicates 
a devotion to the cooperative and its principles. This exper­
ience is quite different from the one at South Bend Lathe com­
pany. There, workers are not controlling the decision-making 
process or even participating in it. Workers, however, are re­
ceiving feedback in the form of money, but these bonuses are not 
distributed equally. In addition, information is not shared with 
the employees, and the attitude of the workers is one of dis­
trust and dismay. 
Yet cooperatives cannot be judged strictly on their ad­
herence to principles of democratization. The plywood cooper­
atives pay all workers the same wage regardless of the task be­
ing performed. This action, however, causes strife between the 
higher skilled and the lower-skilled workers and removes the mon­
etary incentive for workers to develop their skills and make the 
best use of their abilities. The wages at South Bend Lathe, on 
the other hand, were not equal and compensation from the ESOP 
trust fund was partially based on how much one earned. The prob­
lem here is that the wage differential between management and· 
shop floor workers did not change when the company changed to 
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employee ownership; in fact, the differential was increased because 
of the earnings distribution from the ESOP trust fund. 
In section II, I asserted that cooperatives would operate 
more effectively when the wage differential is less than a com­
parable conventional firm butnot:tot~lly equaled. In light of 
the experiences of the plywood cooperatives and the South Bend 
Lathe company, a reduced wage differential would seem most de­
sirable. 
The continuity problem of the plywood cooperatives brings up 
a final point that could be detrimental to the long-run applica­
bility of worker owned firms. If the very success of a coopera­
tive means that it will attract financially rich conventional 
firms which will want to purchase the enterprise, what will stop 
the shareholder-workers from selling their shares at a profit? 
In terms of economics, nothing, but non-economically, the pleasure 
they get from owning the cooperative or working in an environ­
ment which they control are factors that would weigh against the 
decision to sell. Yet because these non-economic factors are 
difficult to measure, it is not clear how much of an effect they 
will have in sustaining the cooperative. Since eighteen ply­
wood cooperatives have survived over time, these non-economic 
factors have made an impact on the decision to change ownership. 
Given our current economic environment, however, it is likely that 
financial gain will weigh more heavily in the decision to sell, 
Thus, cooperatives seem to be most relevant and effective in the 
short-term. 
The next section, using the experiences from the two examples 
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in this section, applies worker ownership to a steel plant. It 
presents a possible cooperative model that can be used as a 
short-term solution for reducing the costs to workers of our 
economy tranferring resources from steel to more high growth 
industries. When worker ownership is applied to a steel plant, 
a new set of problems arise and demand attention. 
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Section V:	 An Internal Organizational Model for a 
Steel Plant 
The two examples of employee ownership presented in the last 
section were taken from labor-intensive enterprises. Applying 
worker ownership to a capital-intensive steel plant, however, 
makes the ownership issue more complicated and less clear. Be­
cause so few, if any, examples exist of capital-intensive cooper­
atives in the United States, there is not solid organizational 
structure to serve as the basis for a worker owned steel plant 
model. In this section, I put forth such a model to point out 
the benfits as well as the unanswered questions of applying em­
ployee ownership to a steel plant. My intent is to provide a 
worker ownership model that adheres to the principles of work­
place democratization while being as economically efficient as 
possible. Furthermore, the model is to be viewed as a short­
run proposal designed to ease the costs placed on the workers 
from resource allocation out of the steel industry. More spe­
cifically, the section begins by discussing worker ownership's 
effect on the high labor cost and the productivity problem con­
fronting steel plants. Next, the model's highly worker controlled 
organizational structure is presented in detail, and this is 
followed by a discussion of worker ownership's effect on steel 
plant reinvestment. 
Two important factors contributing to the American steel in­
dustry's lack of ability to compete in the world market are low 
productivity and high labor costs. The severity of these prob­
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lems can be clearly seen when we compare the experience of the 
United States to that of Japan. IIIn 1958 we used 18.06 man hours 
per metric ton of steel and they were using 61.70. By 1976 
we were using 11.82 man-hours and they were using 10.04. (Fur­
thermore), our unit labor cost was $98.65 against $122.18 in Japan 
in 1958, but in 1976 ours was $294.65 and theirs was $161.93. 11 66 
These statistics will be very difficult to overcome, yet for the 
well-being of.thousands of steelworkers, something should be 
done. Since an industry is made up of individual firms, it 
is at this plant level that higher rates of productivity and 
lower wage costs must begin to appear. Reporting on the Weirton 
issue, Newsweek sheds some light on the issue of wage cuts: IIA1­
though the workers were unwilling to accept pay reductions to en­
rich National's shareholders, there was a chance that they would 
rna ke con ces s ion s to a company they themse1ve sowned. II 670nce the 
employees agreed to purchase the plant, they accepted a 32 percent 
cut in pay. This action at Weirton confirms what seems logically 
c1ear: w0 r ke r s are more 1ike 1y to. accept 1owe r wag es when they 
own and control the firm. 
Combating low rates of product)vity is also something 
worker owned firms have done quite well in'the past. Feelings 
of unity and open communication in a relatively small labor-in­
tensive company, howeyer are much more easily achieved than in a 
huge capital-intensive steel plant .. In order to achieve higher 
rates of productivity and gains in overall plant efficiency, 
an employee owned steel pl~nt'must emphasize worker rep­
resentation at all levels throughout the pl~nt and must prac­
tice and encourage intra-firm communications. These concerns were 
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paramount when designing the following steel plant organizational 
model. Using figure V-I as a guide, we are able to trace the com­
ponents of this proposed structure. 
One of the key points to the model is the establishment of 
an employee stock ownership trust (ESOT). This trust fund 
borrows money from banks and government agencies, such as the 
Economic Development Administration, and then loans the bor­
rowed money to the newly created corporate entity for a block 
of its common stock. The company pays back the loan by distri­
buting a portion of its profits to the employee trust. These 
profits paid into the trust are tax deductible and thus provide 
the company with a healthy tax break. As the loan is paid off, 
the stock held by the trust is equally allocated back to the 
accounts of individual employees. Thus t over time employees 
build up shares and equity in the firm which will not be taxed 
as income until they cash in their shares upon leaving the com­
pany. Furthermore t as profits accumulate, dividends are paid 
out to workers on these company securities. 
Financing the company through an ESOT fund has several 
advantages. The tax break on the profits contributed to the 
employee trust is the prime reason for. an ESOT, but beyond that 
the trust providesamechanfsm "for distributing ownership among 
the workers. By allocating shares equally, the problems that 
occured at South Bend Lathe can be avoided. There the shares 
were distributed according to years of service and how much 
money one earned. This distribution merely fostered strife be­
tween the production workers and the higher paid managers, a 
Figure V-Ia 
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aThe committee level of this organizational chart and the functions of 
those committees are based on an organizational chart from Timothy
Jochim's Employee Stock Ownership and Related Plans, Westport, Connec­
ticut: Quorum Books, 1982. 
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situation which can lower the productivity of a cooperative en­
terprise. Through the issuance of stock shares, the workers 
now have a vested interest in the success of the entire firm, 
and they are receiving monetary feedback in the form of divi­
dends. Furthermore, this equal distribution of shares is more in 
line with the principles of workplace democratization and al­
lows for a better working environment. Employee stock owner­
ship plans, however, are not without criticism. A common com­
plaint of ESOTs is that they replace worker pension plans, since 
the company cannot afford both plans. Thus, the worker's retire­
ment becomes totally dependent on the success of the firm, which 
makes the worker's future very uncertain. Some companies have 
been able to maintain a low funded pension plan along with an 
ESOT, but this depends on the financial resources the new enter­
prise possesses. 
While the ESOT is the workers' mechanism of ownership, 
the workers exercise their influence on the company by electing 
representatives to the board of directors. This board consists of 
four worker representatives (one being the Personnel Committee 
chairperson), the chief executive officer, the chief financial 
officer, one of the plant managers and the president who serves 
as the chairperson. Other organizational structures have included 
community stockholder representatives on the board of directors. 
This, however, depending on the ratio of representatives on the 
board, tends to remove a significant degree of control from the 
workers. The cooperative, however, can indirectly include the 
immediate community's interest in the enterprise by issuing bonds 
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to them. These bonds should be targeted at those people who 
have a similar vested interest in the success of the plant as 
the workers themselves, such as local business persons whose 
economic stability is tied up with the economic stability of the 
mill. Although local community members do not have ownership 
in the plant, they are able to indirectly influence it with their 
money. This represents one option of involving the affected com­
munity in the future of the plant without taking a~ay some own­
ership or control from the workers. 
In terms of decision-making the general population workers 
have special control over certain decisions, since they are 
directly affected by and dependent on the firm. Decisions of 
fundamental change, such as shutdown, layoffs, of plant ex­
pansion, must be approved by 80 percent of the entire body of 
workers before any action can take place. 68· This procedure 
guards against a major action occurring against the majority 
of the worker-owners' wishes, and reinforces the workers' con­
trol of the enterprise. Aside from those major decisions,tbe 
board is in charge of making general company policy. One of 
its most important tasks is to establish the working wage and a 
scale of wage differentials among the employees. This pay scale 
is a delicate subject because one does not want to destroy the 
feelings of cooperation between the managers and the produc­
tion workers by setting a large pay differential, yet greqter 
compensation should be awarded to workers with greater respQn­
sibility and more skills. The desired wage differential, there­
fore, is one that would not create strife between wQrkers qnd 
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would still monetarily encourage workers to best utilize their 
skills and abilities. This is essentially a political decision and 
should be decided by a vote of all the workers. 
Another task of the board of directors, moving down the 
organizational chart, is to hire the management team, con­
sisting of the plant manager, a chief financial officer, a chief 
executive officer, and a president. It is important that these 
individuals understand the intent of employee ownership and how 
it varies from a traditional firm. Furthermore, they must be open 
and responsive to the conerns and suggestions of the workers. In 
addition, it is vital that these managers develop the trust of 
the production workers, since smooth relationships between 
these groups fosters better productivity and a better working 
environment. While the board does hire the management team and 
set the wage differentials, the workers still retain the right to 
appeal any of the board's decisions. Similar to the plywood 
cooperatives, the workers get 10 to 20 percent of the membership 
to sign a petition before any decision can be stopped or re­
evaluated.69 This "right to appeal" clause helps the worker 
representatives to be more sensitive to their constituency's 
needs and concerns. Also. the 10 to 20 percent requirement in­
sures that a sizable portion of the membership responds strongly 
against that particular decision, not just a few individuals, be­
fore any action is taken. 
Up to this point, the role of a union in this model has 
not been addressed. As mentioned "in Section III, the inclusion 
of a union in a worker owned firm requires the union to change 
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from its traditional role to one that is conducive with a 
worker owned enterprise. Union officials must remember that 
while they may be worker representatives, they are expected 
to work with fellow owner-manager representatives in an attitude 
of cooperation, not confrontation. This attitude is important 
because wages are no longer arrived at by hostile owners and 
laborers fighting over a bargaining table for their own sep­
arate group. Workers and owners are now one group and decide 
upon the wage that will best serve the interest of the total 
membership. Currently, however, such a change in national or 
local union policy does not appear likely, especially from the 
U.S.W.A. Thus, it seems that only a company union or a separate 
local union would be able to adapt to the cooperative role. 
These unions are soley represent~tives for the employees of one 
firm; therefore, they are capable of changing with the desires of 
their membership. Interestingly, the union involved with the em­
ployee purchase of the Weirton steel plant is a company union. 
If a company union or a separate local union represents all 
the non-managerial workers, then the union president is given a 
specific position within this employee ownership model. Directly 
under the board of directors (see Figure V~Ia) are 
four committees: the personnel, the executive, the financial, 
and the productivity committee. The union president is chai~person 
of the personnel committee, which is composed of one employee 
from each department. This committee1s function is to be another 
voice for the workers and foster good industrial relations 
within the plant. Also, it serves as a board of appeal or 
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grievance committee where workers can have their disputes aired 
and resolved. If no union exists within the plant, then the 
chairperson of this committee is appointed by the board of directors. 
As for the other committees, the executive committee is 
chaired by the chief executive officer, and the finance committee 
is chaired by the chief financial officer. These two committees 
are generally filled with highly skilled management people who 
are responsible for running the company. The president serves 
on both committees, as do the plant manager~, the directors of 
marketing, and the director of the legal and research sections. 70 
The fourth committee is the productivity committee which is 
chaired by one of the plant managers. Along with this committee, 
each department has its own productivity council whose membership 
is determined by the department employees. From the members, the 
president of the company picks an employee coordinator for the 
council who also serves as the department supervisor and as a 
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member of the productivity commitee. These department pro­
ductivity co~ncils are also in charge of administering produc­
tivity bonus plans. These productivity plans will monetarily re­
ward workers on a regular basis for being more productive, thus 
encouraging workers to find ways of doing their jobs better, which 
results in a bright future for the firm. Although these pro­
ductivity bonus plans alter the workers' compensation, they do 
not subvert the benefits of a reduced wage differential. Every­
one starts with an equal wage, but those that take more initiative 
and are more productive are justly rewarded. If this system is 
explained to workers from the outset and productivity information 
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is openly shared among departments the chances of problems de­
veloping will be reduced. 
In addition to productivity bonus plans, other methods 
are used to make worker-owners more concerned about their jobs 
and their firm. Educating workers on the meaning and respon­
sibilities of employee ownership is very impor~ant. Workers 
must realize that they are expected to make decisions, challenge 
decisions, and give input into decisions. As in a political 
democracy, the workers must also be aware of how the system 
operates in order for that system to be successful. Thus, when 
the new firm opens, groups, similar to Japan's quality control 
circles, or Germany's works councils could be established to 
orient workers to their new roles as worker-entrepreneurs in 
a democratically managed firm. These groups would also provide 
a forum for continued monthly discussions on employee ownership, 
the wage differential, or structural problems within the firm. 
Another incentive program compensates workers for their loyalty 
and willingness to take risks. Through a stock bonus plan workers 
are given extra shares of stock after five years of service; 
therefore, workers have the incentive to stay with the company 
through good times and bad. An additional program is designed to 
shorten the distance between top level managers and production 
workers . This 'Jl,So gr. am r equi rest he pr. esid ent lind the chief executive 
officer to spend one day· per'mOhth working at the productionilevel, 
t~lking with workers, and learning about their jobs. An action 
such as this helps remind all the employees--the workers, the 
managers, and the clerical people--that everyone is on the same 
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team. A united spirit among the worker-owners can only result in 
a better working and a more productive environment. 
This proposed model, therefore, gives ownerships directly 
to the workers. Under this system, those most affected by the 
decisions of the firm do in fact have control over those deci­
sions. Workers are represented at the department level, the com­
mittee level, and on the board of directors. This network of 
representation along with stock ownership gives workers a vested 
interest in the success of the firm. Yet even with this ex­
tensive network of worker representation and monthly small group 
educational meetings, it is not clear whether a sense of unity 
and ownership can be felt among the workers enough to improve 
their rates of productivity significantly. Because examples of 
massive worker owned, integrated steel mills do not exist, one 
can only speculate. It is possible that workers could feel an 
affinity through the programs and components in the model; 
however, whether this feeling is likely to occur is difficult to 
say. 
If the model is indeed hampered by the large expanse of an 
integrated steel mill, its effectivenss may lie in minimills. 
If a large integrated mill closes down, the workers could buy it 
and convert it to several minimills. The differences between a 
minimill and an integrated steel mill lie in its size and its 
cost. liThe efficient size of a steel mill based on blast furnaces 
is four to five million tons of output a year, that of a mini­
mill using an electric-furnace ranges from 100,000 to 500,000 tons 
72depending on the variety of its product lines. 11 Furthermore, 
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the total construction costs for minimills m~y be less than $50 
million. The total construction cost for a new integrated steel 
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mill is about 4.5 billion. Because the plant size is much 
smaller, minimills might be more effective in involving workers 
in ownership. 
Like low productivity and high labor costs, lack of invest­
ment has hurt steel plants and the workers connected with them. 
The majority of steel mills that have shut down in the last 
several years have done so because their rate of return was not 
hiah enough for the owning conglomerate to continue to reinvest 
in the plant. This occurred in Youngstown, Ohio where the 
Lykes Corporation chose to stop investing in the Campbell Works 
of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company rather than modernize its 
facilities. This decision caused 4,100 workers to lose their 
74jobs permanently. A similar situation occurred in Weirton, West 
Virginia where National Steel decided to stop investing in its 
Weirton Steel Mill, threatening the jobs of some 7,000 workers. 75 
The workers offered to purchase the plants in both these cases. 
They were successful in the latter case but not in the former. 
These experiences seem to indicate that the workers, and the 
surrounding community have a different objective function than 
the conventional corporate owner. A large corporation is not 
I 
likely to reinvest in a steel plant if that plant is not achiev­
ing a rate of return deemed "acceptable" to the corporation. The 
plant may in fact be profitable, but just not profitable enough. 
If the workers, however, do indeed strongly value employment 
stability, geographic location, and a sense of community heritage, 
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then they are more likely to accept a lower rate of return than 
the traditional corporation. The minimum rate of return workers 
would be willing to accept would probably be that needed to 
maintain an "adequate" standard of living. This could mean th~t 
the workers' Ad (the addition to their aspired income for the 
current year) is keeping up with the rate of inflation. Thus 
because workers have different priorities and are willing to ac~ 
cept a lower rate of return, they will invest beyond the point of a 
traditional firm which has its own objective function and more 
attractive investment opportunities elsewhere. 
In order for workers to provide adequate funds for invest­
ment, however, they must see the connection between investment 
and their current compensation. For example, income earned 
under the model proposed in this section can be divided into three 
areas. It can be paid out as dividends on the stock shares 1Ad); 
(~~ 
it can be paid out in the form of wages (d), or it can be put into 
~ retained earnings~ The link that needs to be pointed out and 
understood by all the worker-owners is that the current Ad and d 
are the result of contributions made to retained earnings in an 
earlier time period. Thus, if workers want to insure themselves 
an adequate wage in the future, they must free up fvnds for "in­
vestment now. Likewise, if workers are concerned about employ­
ment stability and community roots, they must not take all the 
earnings home in the form of compensation but rather maintain 
an adequate savings pool. Workers, however, will have to be 
educated in this type of concern for savings since they have 
traditionally not entered into investment decisions within con­
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ventional firms. Under the proposed model, workers will be ed­
ucated on their role as entrepreneur and on the virtues of in­
vestment through the small groups established to discuss and 
acquaint workers with the structure of employee ownership. Since 
these groups meet once a month, lack of understanding can be 
cleared up on a continual basis. 
In summation, the advantages of employee ownership in 
general and this model in particular stem from the fact that they 
allow workers to control their own economic futures. With such 
control, workers are more likely to take a reduction in pay 
than would be the case in a conventional firm. Also, with 
control over the decision-making process of their plant, the 
workers are likely to work with the knowledge that they run the 
enterprise and that they directly receive the monetary benefits 
of higher productivity. Furthermore, because a worker owned 
plant has different objective functions and priorities than a 
conventionally owned firm, the worker owned plant would maintain a 
more stable workforce and continue to reinvest in their plant 
beyond that of a conventional owner. 
However, when these advantages of employee owner~h,p are as.­
sessed through the context of a large integrated steel mtll, 
their outcomes are less clear and less positive. The sheer size 
of the plant may hinder workers from feeling that they have any 
control over the plant1s decisions or the bureaucracy of rep­
resentation may grow so large that workers would once again feel 
like workers not owners. These situations could severely cripple 
the cooperative1s ability to significantly increase productivity. 
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In addition, employee owned firms require the union to playa 
difficult role, given its current attitude and behavior. Al­
though company unions or separate local unions have the poten­
tial to work within an employee owned plant, it remains to be 
seen whether they can significantly alter their traditional 
union attitude. The internal organizational model presented in 
this section highlights the benefits worker ownership can offer 
a capital-intensive steel plant, but at the same time, the model 
raises some questions which need to be, but have not beenJ fully 
answered. 
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Section VI: Conclusion 
Many factors have contributed to the steel industry's de­
cline over the last two decades. The depletion of local low­
cost iron ore deposits caused the price of iron ore to increase 
dramatically for U.S. firms, permanently removing a key advantage 
over foreign steel producers. Furthermore, the lack of modern 
capital equipment and high labor costs have damaged the American 
steel industry's ability to compete with other countries. As 
the industry has continued to lose its share of the world market, 
many steel firms have diversified their investments and bought 
up firms in other sectors of the economy. As conglomerates, 
these firms efficiently allocate resources and investment funds 
to the area providing the highest rate of return. This has 
meant that funds have been transferred from steel plants and put 
into higher growth subsidiaries. 
The result of this disinvestment has been and continues to 
be widespread unemployment among steelworkers in the Midwest and 
the Northeast, where most of the old, large integrated steel 
mills are concentrated. Thousands of workers have lost their 
jobs because corporations are closing plants that don't make enough 
profit. In addition, many communities are decaying economically 
because their major employer--the steel mill--has shut down op­
erations. 
Worker ownership provides a way to alleviate the regional un­
employment problems of steelworkers. Employee ownership recog­
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nizes the difference in the values of steelworkers and conglom­
erate owners. The worker's desire for employment stability often 
clashes with the conglomerate's desire for a high rate of return. 
Worker ownership switches the existing order around. It gives 
workers the power to decide what rate of return is acceptable 
for them and allows them to maintain employment and economic vi­
tality in their communities. Instead of having some far away 
corporate headquarters decide the economic fate of thousands of 
workers and their respective communities, worker ownership gives 
the power of decision to those who are most affected by those 
decisions. 
In the context of a steel plant, however t worker ownership 
does result in an explicit trade-off with allocative . ~fficiency. 
Because an employee owned steel plant operates with a different 
priority or objective function t it prohibits the maximum trans­
ference of resources into higher growth firms. Thus, in order 
to maintain employment in these geographic regions, some degree 
of allocative efficiency will have to be sacrificed. 
Yet, it appears that this sacrifice will only take place in 
the short-run. It is quite likely that if a worker owned plant: 
became profitable, a large conventionally owned firm with greater 
financial resources would offer to buyout its stock shares.at a 
profit for the worker. The succ~ss of such a purchase depends on 
how tempting the offer is and the age and attitud~'comp6sition Of 
the plant worker-owners. If the purchase is successful, the workers 
make a handsome profit but the cooperative dies. In terms of a 
steel plant, it is not likely that a worker ownership or tra­
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ditional ownership could revive the big, old steel mills to com­
pete in today's market in the long-run. Therefore, the most ef­
fective application of worker ownership to steel plants is as a 
short-term means of maintaining regional employment and easing the 
transition our economy is making out of steel. 
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